Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improving Air Quality
148
1 4 8
to work cooperatively to address climate change. Social norms are able to
explain much of the observed cooperative behavior, and although they can
be more complex to work with technological advances, they are often very
powerful. Social norms build upon individual local contributions to climate
change that have global benefits.
The literature on managing the atmosphere as a global commons includes
information that is beneficial in developing policy to address both challenges
together (Soroos, 1995). The limits on the atmosphere as a sink for carbon
dioxide, methane, and other air pollutants have received much attention
because of the great impact on human health and quality of life. The feasibility of approaches to address climate change and air pollution together
can be enhanced if the Ostrom principles are applied, and this includes
the recognition that the methods to develop regulations and enforce them
will likely vary from country to country. For instance, although actions to
address air quality in a large city may be very different from the actions
taken in rural areas, they both have local value and outcomes, and they
both have global value in terms of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
The Montreal Protocol is an example of a successful global agreement that
has been beneficial to society because of the positive actions that have been
taken to reduce emissions (Soroos, 1995).
References
Air Quality Information (2012). Retrieved from www.valleyair.org/ aqinfo/ aqdataidx.
htm
Apesteguia, J. and Maier- Rigaud, F.P. (2006). The role of rivalry: Public goods versus
common pool resources. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50: 646– 663. doi:10.1177/
0022002706290433.
Arrow, K.J., Keohane, R. O., and Levin, S.A. (2012). Elinor Ostrom: An uncommon
woman for the commons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
109: 13,135– 13,136. doi:10.1073/ pnas.1210827109.
Battersby, S. (2017, January 3). Can humankind escape the tragedy of the commons?
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114: 1, 7– 10; www.pnas.org/
Carattini, S., Levin, S., and Tavoni, A. (2017). Cooperation in the climate commons.
Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 292; www.
cccep.ac.uk/
Chacksfield, A. (1993). Polycentric law versus the minimal state: the case of air
pollution. Political Notes 76, Libertarian Alliance.
Cox, M., Arnold, G., and Tomás, S.V. (2010). A review of design principles for
community- based natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15: 38;
www.ecologyandsociety.org/ vol15/ iss4/ art38/
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., and Stern, P. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons, Science
302: 1907– 1912.
148
1 4 8
to work cooperatively to address climate change. Social norms are able to
explain much of the observed cooperative behavior, and although they can
be more complex to work with technological advances, they are often very
powerful. Social norms build upon individual local contributions to climate
change that have global benefits.
The literature on managing the atmosphere as a global commons includes
information that is beneficial in developing policy to address both challenges
together (Soroos, 1995). The limits on the atmosphere as a sink for carbon
dioxide, methane, and other air pollutants have received much attention
because of the great impact on human health and quality of life. The feasibility of approaches to address climate change and air pollution together
can be enhanced if the Ostrom principles are applied, and this includes
the recognition that the methods to develop regulations and enforce them
will likely vary from country to country. For instance, although actions to
address air quality in a large city may be very different from the actions
taken in rural areas, they both have local value and outcomes, and they
both have global value in terms of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
The Montreal Protocol is an example of a successful global agreement that
has been beneficial to society because of the positive actions that have been
taken to reduce emissions (Soroos, 1995).
References
Air Quality Information (2012). Retrieved from www.valleyair.org/ aqinfo/ aqdataidx.
htm
Apesteguia, J. and Maier- Rigaud, F.P. (2006). The role of rivalry: Public goods versus
common pool resources. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50: 646– 663. doi:10.1177/
0022002706290433.
Arrow, K.J., Keohane, R. O., and Levin, S.A. (2012). Elinor Ostrom: An uncommon
woman for the commons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
109: 13,135– 13,136. doi:10.1073/ pnas.1210827109.
Battersby, S. (2017, January 3). Can humankind escape the tragedy of the commons?
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114: 1, 7– 10; www.pnas.org/
Carattini, S., Levin, S., and Tavoni, A. (2017). Cooperation in the climate commons.
Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 292; www.
cccep.ac.uk/
Chacksfield, A. (1993). Polycentric law versus the minimal state: the case of air
pollution. Political Notes 76, Libertarian Alliance.
Cox, M., Arnold, G., and Tomás, S.V. (2010). A review of design principles for
community- based natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15: 38;
www.ecologyandsociety.org/ vol15/ iss4/ art38/
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., and Stern, P. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons, Science
302: 1907– 1912.