Urban governance 103
working on it either, really. They have a clear historical role in ensuring
that waste is safely removed from the city and handled properly. That’s
the most important task they have.
(Respondent from the Agency for Energy Recovery in the
City of Oslo)
This observed lack of coordination across the public and private sectors is an
example of how existing working practices in silos do not facilitate crosssectoral collaboration towards common goals. Such forms of silo- based organisation within and beyond the municipality represent fragmented incentive
structures and a potential barrier to more radical innovation and change.
5.5.2 How are missions defined? From problem solving to problem
setting
The legal regulations of waste treatment governance in Oslo restrict public
actors from processing waste from the private sector and vice versa. This may
constitute a somewhat rigid institutional framework and limited incentives
and action space for innovation. A natural consequence of the fragmented
relation across the public and private sectors in Oslo is potentially limited
joint reflexivity and learning across the two domains. The tendering practices
observed in Oslo associated with extensive outsourcing of municipal service
provisions for collecting waste and transportation to private contractors also
establish clear boundaries between the commissioner and the contractor,
which may serve to hinder dialogue and mutual learning. Relatively standardised services such as waste collection and transporting have been outsourced to private contractors, whereas the development and planning of the
processing of the waste streams is accomplished in- house in the municipality.
Traditional bureaucracy and silo- based working practices in the public
sector typically execute power and set top- down political goals, which serves
to give direction for system change. Internal direction setting in collaboration
with the political level and EGE, and the creation of a circular system of biofertiliser and biogas to be used in the Oslo region, signals a traditional bureaucratic type of governance. EGE’s ownership of the infrastructure and facilities
also reflects a bureaucratic governance regime, which may constitute a barrier
to process innovation in terms of synergies with other waste streams from the
private sector.
As such, it seems appropriate to question the balance and relationship
between problem setting and problem solving in the governance of urban
(organic) waste in Oslo. Each municipal department has their respective mandates and there is limited coordination or joint experimentation across municipal departments. One potential limitation to such a governance mode is a
weakened ability to broaden perspectives and raise ambitions in relation to
sustainability in urban waste treatment. In principle, such a deficit could have
been addressed at the national level. However, although Norway has a
working on it either, really. They have a clear historical role in ensuring
that waste is safely removed from the city and handled properly. That’s
the most important task they have.
(Respondent from the Agency for Energy Recovery in the
City of Oslo)
This observed lack of coordination across the public and private sectors is an
example of how existing working practices in silos do not facilitate crosssectoral collaboration towards common goals. Such forms of silo- based organisation within and beyond the municipality represent fragmented incentive
structures and a potential barrier to more radical innovation and change.
5.5.2 How are missions defined? From problem solving to problem
setting
The legal regulations of waste treatment governance in Oslo restrict public
actors from processing waste from the private sector and vice versa. This may
constitute a somewhat rigid institutional framework and limited incentives
and action space for innovation. A natural consequence of the fragmented
relation across the public and private sectors in Oslo is potentially limited
joint reflexivity and learning across the two domains. The tendering practices
observed in Oslo associated with extensive outsourcing of municipal service
provisions for collecting waste and transportation to private contractors also
establish clear boundaries between the commissioner and the contractor,
which may serve to hinder dialogue and mutual learning. Relatively standardised services such as waste collection and transporting have been outsourced to private contractors, whereas the development and planning of the
processing of the waste streams is accomplished in- house in the municipality.
Traditional bureaucracy and silo- based working practices in the public
sector typically execute power and set top- down political goals, which serves
to give direction for system change. Internal direction setting in collaboration
with the political level and EGE, and the creation of a circular system of biofertiliser and biogas to be used in the Oslo region, signals a traditional bureaucratic type of governance. EGE’s ownership of the infrastructure and facilities
also reflects a bureaucratic governance regime, which may constitute a barrier
to process innovation in terms of synergies with other waste streams from the
private sector.
As such, it seems appropriate to question the balance and relationship
between problem setting and problem solving in the governance of urban
(organic) waste in Oslo. Each municipal department has their respective mandates and there is limited coordination or joint experimentation across municipal departments. One potential limitation to such a governance mode is a
weakened ability to broaden perspectives and raise ambitions in relation to
sustainability in urban waste treatment. In principle, such a deficit could have
been addressed at the national level. However, although Norway has a