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merit attention when discussing interdependencies in the context of adoption. In
fact, we see that more recent perspectives on innovation than the traditional view
described by Rogers (1995) pay considerable attention to issues pertaining to institutions. Currently dominant institutional configurations (or regimes) are often
regarded as an obstacle to change and innovation (Geels and Schot 2007); for example, prevailing flat price setting arrangements in the value chain may obstruct the
use of quality-enhancing technologies by farmers. At the same time, the existence
of such obstacles leads to a call for ‘institutional innovation’ as an integral component of socio-technical transformation, in this example, the introduction of quality
control and price differentiation arrangements to enable farmers to invest in qualityenhancing practices and technologies (Leeuwis 2013). Moreover, innovation processes themselves are seen to be influenced by institutional set-ups that govern
interaction between actors in an ‘innovation system’ or ‘innovation ecology’ (Hall
et al. 2007; Leeuwis et al. 2017), for example, the reward systems in universities
may hinder conducive interaction between researchers from different disciplines
and/or prevent scholar to engage actively with societal stakeholders.
4.4 Linking Institutional Explanations
to Individual Explanations
The question then is how institutional explanations and more individual considerations relate to each other and how the former may be taken into account in a model
that complements (but also still builds on) an individualist perspective. We would
propose that institutions tend to create resources and (dis)incentives that may enter
people’s considerations in several ways.
Clearly, rules and arrangements can be seen as shaping the ways in which social
influence and social pressure may be exerted or experienced. For example, the standards and rules implied in certification and pricing systems may be used by traders
as a leverage to negotiate prices and/or provide (or deny) access to certain market
channels and thus operate as an (dis)incentive for farmers to produce in a certain
manner. At the same time, such (dis)incentives are likely to affect people’s aspirations and alter the balance in assessing trade-offs between different goals. Moreover,
the existence of community by-laws and accompanying control and sanctioning
systems may affect the extent to which farmers trust their neighbours in adhering to
preventive measures against diseases. Institutions may also shape the knowledge
and beliefs that people have about the world and/or about the outcomes of specific
behaviours. The belonging to certain scientific disciplines, religious groups or cultural communities, for example, impinges on how people consider their relation
with nature (Douglas 1970) and also on agricultural knowledge and beliefs. Organic
farmers, for example, tend to have a very different belief system regarding the control of diseases and/or the management of soil fertility than so-called ‘regular’
C. Leeuwis and N. Aarts
merit attention when discussing interdependencies in the context of adoption. In
fact, we see that more recent perspectives on innovation than the traditional view
described by Rogers (1995) pay considerable attention to issues pertaining to institutions. Currently dominant institutional configurations (or regimes) are often
regarded as an obstacle to change and innovation (Geels and Schot 2007); for example, prevailing flat price setting arrangements in the value chain may obstruct the
use of quality-enhancing technologies by farmers. At the same time, the existence
of such obstacles leads to a call for ‘institutional innovation’ as an integral component of socio-technical transformation, in this example, the introduction of quality
control and price differentiation arrangements to enable farmers to invest in qualityenhancing practices and technologies (Leeuwis 2013). Moreover, innovation processes themselves are seen to be influenced by institutional set-ups that govern
interaction between actors in an ‘innovation system’ or ‘innovation ecology’ (Hall
et al. 2007; Leeuwis et al. 2017), for example, the reward systems in universities
may hinder conducive interaction between researchers from different disciplines
and/or prevent scholar to engage actively with societal stakeholders.
4.4 Linking Institutional Explanations
to Individual Explanations
The question then is how institutional explanations and more individual considerations relate to each other and how the former may be taken into account in a model
that complements (but also still builds on) an individualist perspective. We would
propose that institutions tend to create resources and (dis)incentives that may enter
people’s considerations in several ways.
Clearly, rules and arrangements can be seen as shaping the ways in which social
influence and social pressure may be exerted or experienced. For example, the standards and rules implied in certification and pricing systems may be used by traders
as a leverage to negotiate prices and/or provide (or deny) access to certain market
channels and thus operate as an (dis)incentive for farmers to produce in a certain
manner. At the same time, such (dis)incentives are likely to affect people’s aspirations and alter the balance in assessing trade-offs between different goals. Moreover,
the existence of community by-laws and accompanying control and sanctioning
systems may affect the extent to which farmers trust their neighbours in adhering to
preventive measures against diseases. Institutions may also shape the knowledge
and beliefs that people have about the world and/or about the outcomes of specific
behaviours. The belonging to certain scientific disciplines, religious groups or cultural communities, for example, impinges on how people consider their relation
with nature (Douglas 1970) and also on agricultural knowledge and beliefs. Organic
farmers, for example, tend to have a very different belief system regarding the control of diseases and/or the management of soil fertility than so-called ‘regular’
C. Leeuwis and N. Aarts