56
Subtle Agroecologies
In the Middle Ages, property in land was understood to exist ‘legally’ but not according to Natural
Law.
Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things
should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because the
division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement
which belongs to positive law.
Aquinas (1920: IIa-IIae, q. lxvi, art. 2)
According to Natural Law, there can be no ownership of what nature provides freely for all. The legal
arrangement was simply pragmatic. It assured that property would be cared for as an owner would
wish to use it to advantage. But this was qualifed by the concept of right use, which meant that all
property, not only land, should be employed in such ways as contributed to the common good.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. On this respect
man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.
(ibid)
This meant that, should anyone be destitute, they were free to take whatever they needed from those
with suffcient. The law of theft was suspended and Natural Law re-established (ibid). The modern
conception of ‘absolute ownership’, which allows an owner to dispose of private property however
they please, even to destroy it, did not exist. There is a clue in the word ‘private’ which means to be
separated from the whole, to be alienated, from which ‘privation’ is derived. Thus, private ownership implied separation of both property and person from society and from nature. In other words,
law in the Middle Ages implied duties to the community and to nature, as distinct from rights which
make claims open community and nature. Natural Law understands the human person as already a
participant in the community, while modern rights law understands the human person as contracting into community. 11
THE RISE OF THE PROPRIETORIAL SELF
This ancient understanding seems to be natural to indigenous societies, such as the Kalahari
Bushmen, the North American Indians or the Australian Aboriginals, for whom landownership
has no meaning. The modern West has lost this natural relation to the world. With the rise of individualism, the sense of community has been eroded, and this has given rise to the ‘proprietorial
self’ – the self conceived in terms of extended ownership. 12 Almost the whole of modern economic theory is built upon the notion of ownership, of acquiring and consuming, rather than
responsible use. 13 Modern westerners defne themselves in terms of self-ownership and the notion
that ownership confers absolute right of disposal (Locke, 1969). The ancient prohibition against
suicide, for example, was based on Natural Law which regarded the biosphere as outside ownership. Ownership can only ever be a legal arrangement, a part of positive law, but not of Natural
Law. 14
11 For a discussion of the rise of ‘subjective rights’ to property in the late Middle Ages, see Annabel S. Brett Liberty, Right
and Nature (1997).
12 For a full discussion of this, see C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(2011).
13 For an illuminating discussion of medieval economic teaching, see Christopher Franks, He Became Poor (2009).
14 A powerful critique of Locke’s theory of private ownership of land is given in 1832 by Thomas Rutherforth in his Institutes
of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis (2016: Chapter 3, X).
Subtle Agroecologies
In the Middle Ages, property in land was understood to exist ‘legally’ but not according to Natural
Law.
Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things
should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because the
division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement
which belongs to positive law.
Aquinas (1920: IIa-IIae, q. lxvi, art. 2)
According to Natural Law, there can be no ownership of what nature provides freely for all. The legal
arrangement was simply pragmatic. It assured that property would be cared for as an owner would
wish to use it to advantage. But this was qualifed by the concept of right use, which meant that all
property, not only land, should be employed in such ways as contributed to the common good.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. On this respect
man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.
(ibid)
This meant that, should anyone be destitute, they were free to take whatever they needed from those
with suffcient. The law of theft was suspended and Natural Law re-established (ibid). The modern
conception of ‘absolute ownership’, which allows an owner to dispose of private property however
they please, even to destroy it, did not exist. There is a clue in the word ‘private’ which means to be
separated from the whole, to be alienated, from which ‘privation’ is derived. Thus, private ownership implied separation of both property and person from society and from nature. In other words,
law in the Middle Ages implied duties to the community and to nature, as distinct from rights which
make claims open community and nature. Natural Law understands the human person as already a
participant in the community, while modern rights law understands the human person as contracting into community. 11
THE RISE OF THE PROPRIETORIAL SELF
This ancient understanding seems to be natural to indigenous societies, such as the Kalahari
Bushmen, the North American Indians or the Australian Aboriginals, for whom landownership
has no meaning. The modern West has lost this natural relation to the world. With the rise of individualism, the sense of community has been eroded, and this has given rise to the ‘proprietorial
self’ – the self conceived in terms of extended ownership. 12 Almost the whole of modern economic theory is built upon the notion of ownership, of acquiring and consuming, rather than
responsible use. 13 Modern westerners defne themselves in terms of self-ownership and the notion
that ownership confers absolute right of disposal (Locke, 1969). The ancient prohibition against
suicide, for example, was based on Natural Law which regarded the biosphere as outside ownership. Ownership can only ever be a legal arrangement, a part of positive law, but not of Natural
Law. 14
11 For a discussion of the rise of ‘subjective rights’ to property in the late Middle Ages, see Annabel S. Brett Liberty, Right
and Nature (1997).
12 For a full discussion of this, see C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(2011).
13 For an illuminating discussion of medieval economic teaching, see Christopher Franks, He Became Poor (2009).
14 A powerful critique of Locke’s theory of private ownership of land is given in 1832 by Thomas Rutherforth in his Institutes
of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis (2016: Chapter 3, X).