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Subtle Agroecologies
oneself too thinly to make any progress in any feld of science. To understand this and to make sense
of Goethe’s scientifc writings and discoveries, we have to understand him as embracing a form of
holism, of seeing nature as one, and investigating sides of that whole in order to see it in its fullness.
In order to present a picture of his approach, I will focus on three aspects of Goethe’s science:
the rejection of an over-reliance on theory; the grasping of nature as being in fux; and the role of
human faculties in understanding nature. In all of these aspects, he was neither representative of his
own time nor foreshadowing the direction that science was to follow. Furthermore, although he did
have an early fascination with alchemy, and draws on it in his literary work (Gray, 1952), what he
was doing here was something new.
THE REJECTION OF OVER-RELIANCE ON THEORY
At the time that Goethe was writing, mechanistic, reductionist ways of thinking were becoming
prevalent in society and science, and these were leading to impressive discoveries and inventions.
However, for Goethe, these discoveries were often misunderstandings and science itself was being
driven up a blind alley. One aspect of the practice of science on which Goethe writes extensively is
the movement towards an over-reliance on theory. What happens is that we no longer see the phenomenon we seek to understand; we see only our own construct. As Goethe argued:
Someday someone will write a pathology of experimental physics and bring to light all those swindles
which subvert our reason, beguile our judgement and, what is worse, stand in the way of any practical
progress. The phenomena must be freed once and for all from their grim torture chamber of empiricism, mechanism, and dogmatism; they must be brought before the jury of man’s common sense.
von Goethe (1995: 309)
Goethe is not saying that theory or hypothesis has no role in scientifc investigation; he does, however, want to rein it in and sees it as a tool that needs very careful handling. Goethe rejects both the
over-reliance on theory to determine what to look for and the habits of mind that construct phenomena in the way suggested by the preconceived theory. A strong example of this criticism can be seen
in the following quotation:
To rid the human mind of an hypothesis that has unduly restricted it, forcing it to observe erroneously
and to combine falsely, to muse instead of seeing, to sophisticate instead of judging, is already to render
it an inestimable service. Henceforth it sees the phenomena with greater openness of mind, in other
relations and interconnections, orders them after its own manner, and once more gets the chance to err
after its own manner, a chance that is invaluable if it soon succeeds in perceiving its error.
Goethe, Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften Vol 4, Part 2, cited in Heinemann, (1934: 68)
The method by which one is to ‘rid the mind’ of constricting hypotheses is to approach the phenomenon from all directions. One of these directions will be prior hypotheses, but that is only one
direction amongst many diverse approaches. Apart from the importance of a full investigation of the
phenomenon as experienced by the scientist, there is also, as the latter part of the quotation reveals,
the conscious attention to the action of theory, hypotheses and opinion on perception itself. Thus,
the scientist has to investigate his/her own mind as well as nature to ensure that the necessary openness is maintained and to let the mental faculties be guided by nature.
Out of the many scientifc works by Goethe across a range of felds, he fnds certain principles
that are evident in nature and these, for him, help to explain its endless creativity (Tantillo, 2002).
Rather than having strict laws circumscribing what is possible, these four principles are better seen
as ways of capturing the way nature does what it does. They are as follows:
Polarity: Goethe’s term for the way nature is creative through the juxtaposing of opposites; it
remains in fux by breaking apart and rejoining.
Subtle Agroecologies
oneself too thinly to make any progress in any feld of science. To understand this and to make sense
of Goethe’s scientifc writings and discoveries, we have to understand him as embracing a form of
holism, of seeing nature as one, and investigating sides of that whole in order to see it in its fullness.
In order to present a picture of his approach, I will focus on three aspects of Goethe’s science:
the rejection of an over-reliance on theory; the grasping of nature as being in fux; and the role of
human faculties in understanding nature. In all of these aspects, he was neither representative of his
own time nor foreshadowing the direction that science was to follow. Furthermore, although he did
have an early fascination with alchemy, and draws on it in his literary work (Gray, 1952), what he
was doing here was something new.
THE REJECTION OF OVER-RELIANCE ON THEORY
At the time that Goethe was writing, mechanistic, reductionist ways of thinking were becoming
prevalent in society and science, and these were leading to impressive discoveries and inventions.
However, for Goethe, these discoveries were often misunderstandings and science itself was being
driven up a blind alley. One aspect of the practice of science on which Goethe writes extensively is
the movement towards an over-reliance on theory. What happens is that we no longer see the phenomenon we seek to understand; we see only our own construct. As Goethe argued:
Someday someone will write a pathology of experimental physics and bring to light all those swindles
which subvert our reason, beguile our judgement and, what is worse, stand in the way of any practical
progress. The phenomena must be freed once and for all from their grim torture chamber of empiricism, mechanism, and dogmatism; they must be brought before the jury of man’s common sense.
von Goethe (1995: 309)
Goethe is not saying that theory or hypothesis has no role in scientifc investigation; he does, however, want to rein it in and sees it as a tool that needs very careful handling. Goethe rejects both the
over-reliance on theory to determine what to look for and the habits of mind that construct phenomena in the way suggested by the preconceived theory. A strong example of this criticism can be seen
in the following quotation:
To rid the human mind of an hypothesis that has unduly restricted it, forcing it to observe erroneously
and to combine falsely, to muse instead of seeing, to sophisticate instead of judging, is already to render
it an inestimable service. Henceforth it sees the phenomena with greater openness of mind, in other
relations and interconnections, orders them after its own manner, and once more gets the chance to err
after its own manner, a chance that is invaluable if it soon succeeds in perceiving its error.
Goethe, Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften Vol 4, Part 2, cited in Heinemann, (1934: 68)
The method by which one is to ‘rid the mind’ of constricting hypotheses is to approach the phenomenon from all directions. One of these directions will be prior hypotheses, but that is only one
direction amongst many diverse approaches. Apart from the importance of a full investigation of the
phenomenon as experienced by the scientist, there is also, as the latter part of the quotation reveals,
the conscious attention to the action of theory, hypotheses and opinion on perception itself. Thus,
the scientist has to investigate his/her own mind as well as nature to ensure that the necessary openness is maintained and to let the mental faculties be guided by nature.
Out of the many scientifc works by Goethe across a range of felds, he fnds certain principles
that are evident in nature and these, for him, help to explain its endless creativity (Tantillo, 2002).
Rather than having strict laws circumscribing what is possible, these four principles are better seen
as ways of capturing the way nature does what it does. They are as follows:
Polarity: Goethe’s term for the way nature is creative through the juxtaposing of opposites; it
remains in fux by breaking apart and rejoining.