65
Humans Are Humus
the microbiome in our intestines. He undertook experiments with rats 1 and probiotics, with results
showing that rats fed probiotics survive longer in standard stress tests (almost double in some cases).
This increase in stamina was isolated to the probiotics by cutting the vagus nerve (which runs from
the intestines to the brain) in a subsequent experiment, whereby those rats fed probiotics but whose
vagus nerve was cut reverted back to a regular stress test endurance. One philosophical extrapolation of these fndings is that even the human sense of ‘will’ may not be entirely human! When rats
fed probiotics tried to endure the stress test for longer periods of time, those who have had their
vagus nerve cut returned to normal levels. This suggested to Dr. Cryan that the biotic community
in the rats used the vagus nerve to stimulate a longer sense of self-preservation. So, shouldn’t an
understanding of what a rat ‘self’ is, and by extension a human ‘self’, include those very same beings
who contributed to the rats’ and to human preservation?
However, with the one-sided epistemology of a rational, empiricist scientism, there is little
chance of understanding the complexity of this non-dual relationship. Eco-psychology, on the other
hand, emphasises the necessity of multiple epistemologies. Metzner (1999) incorporated alternative
epistemologies as an integral part of his ‘green psychology’ (p. 175). Sewall (1995) goes so far as to
delineate the ways in which alternative perceptions can assist in the task of reconnection: ‘We begin
to care for that which we see, and ideally, we fnd ourselves loving the material world, our Earth.
Because love alters behaviour, honouring sensory and sensual experience may be fundamental to
the preservation of the Earth’ (p. 203).
One often-overlooked implication of the singular emphasis on empiricism is the subtle materialism that results, which only continues the dualistic paradigm. Cox (2014) articulated the concept of
subtle materialism, building on the concept of Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman’s subtle reductionism, ‘whereby ecological relationships are principally conceived as relationships between material
objects that lack a subjective, interior mode of existence’ (p. 96). This subtle materialism, which
even Aldo Leopold occasionally recapitulates, has two negative results. One is anthropocentric in
that interiority is only ascribed to humans. The other is that relationships between beings are only
depicted in materialistic terms.
The roots of this reductionism in ecology theory can be traced back, in part, to Arthur Tansley
(as cited in Cox, 2014: 113) who, in 1935, made an explicit effort to move ecology away from
‘communities’ and instead coined the term ecosystem. Worster (1985) expressed:
The often-repeated notion that the plant assemblage is more than the sum of its parts, that it forms a
whole which resists reductive analysis, he took to be a fction worked up by an overexcited imagination… In short, Tansley hoped to purge from ecology all that was not subject to quantifcation and
analysis, all those obscurities that had been a part of its baggage at least since the Romantic period.
Worster (1985: 301)
However, when it comes to the history of alternative agricultures, alternative epistemologies are
almost always invoked alongside alternative practices (Cox, 2014: 56). Two quotations will suffce
here for the purposes of illustration. The frst is Wes Jackson (cited in Cox, 2014), who discussed
inherited worldviews in ways similar to the discussion above: ‘Here lies my worry. Most proposals
for bringing about a sustainable agriculture and culture carry the fngerprints or markings of the
Baconian-Cartesian worldview. At best, it amounts to Smart Resource Management’ (p. 51). The
second is Wendell Berry (also cited in Cox, 2014), who is overt in his mistrust of reductionism:
‘Reduction does not necessarily limit itself to compacting and organizing knowledge; it also has the
power to change what is known’ (p. 123). Thus, eco-psychology, which is partially constituted by
its inclusion of alternative epistemologies, pairs extremely well with alternative agricultures, which
also are made up of ways of knowing that go beyond scientistic empiricism and subtle materialism.
1 This author wants to acknowledge that this example is problematic as an example of human interrelationship to the
more-than-human world, given that it involves rats being used in very instrumental ways.
Humans Are Humus
the microbiome in our intestines. He undertook experiments with rats 1 and probiotics, with results
showing that rats fed probiotics survive longer in standard stress tests (almost double in some cases).
This increase in stamina was isolated to the probiotics by cutting the vagus nerve (which runs from
the intestines to the brain) in a subsequent experiment, whereby those rats fed probiotics but whose
vagus nerve was cut reverted back to a regular stress test endurance. One philosophical extrapolation of these fndings is that even the human sense of ‘will’ may not be entirely human! When rats
fed probiotics tried to endure the stress test for longer periods of time, those who have had their
vagus nerve cut returned to normal levels. This suggested to Dr. Cryan that the biotic community
in the rats used the vagus nerve to stimulate a longer sense of self-preservation. So, shouldn’t an
understanding of what a rat ‘self’ is, and by extension a human ‘self’, include those very same beings
who contributed to the rats’ and to human preservation?
However, with the one-sided epistemology of a rational, empiricist scientism, there is little
chance of understanding the complexity of this non-dual relationship. Eco-psychology, on the other
hand, emphasises the necessity of multiple epistemologies. Metzner (1999) incorporated alternative
epistemologies as an integral part of his ‘green psychology’ (p. 175). Sewall (1995) goes so far as to
delineate the ways in which alternative perceptions can assist in the task of reconnection: ‘We begin
to care for that which we see, and ideally, we fnd ourselves loving the material world, our Earth.
Because love alters behaviour, honouring sensory and sensual experience may be fundamental to
the preservation of the Earth’ (p. 203).
One often-overlooked implication of the singular emphasis on empiricism is the subtle materialism that results, which only continues the dualistic paradigm. Cox (2014) articulated the concept of
subtle materialism, building on the concept of Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman’s subtle reductionism, ‘whereby ecological relationships are principally conceived as relationships between material
objects that lack a subjective, interior mode of existence’ (p. 96). This subtle materialism, which
even Aldo Leopold occasionally recapitulates, has two negative results. One is anthropocentric in
that interiority is only ascribed to humans. The other is that relationships between beings are only
depicted in materialistic terms.
The roots of this reductionism in ecology theory can be traced back, in part, to Arthur Tansley
(as cited in Cox, 2014: 113) who, in 1935, made an explicit effort to move ecology away from
‘communities’ and instead coined the term ecosystem. Worster (1985) expressed:
The often-repeated notion that the plant assemblage is more than the sum of its parts, that it forms a
whole which resists reductive analysis, he took to be a fction worked up by an overexcited imagination… In short, Tansley hoped to purge from ecology all that was not subject to quantifcation and
analysis, all those obscurities that had been a part of its baggage at least since the Romantic period.
Worster (1985: 301)
However, when it comes to the history of alternative agricultures, alternative epistemologies are
almost always invoked alongside alternative practices (Cox, 2014: 56). Two quotations will suffce
here for the purposes of illustration. The frst is Wes Jackson (cited in Cox, 2014), who discussed
inherited worldviews in ways similar to the discussion above: ‘Here lies my worry. Most proposals
for bringing about a sustainable agriculture and culture carry the fngerprints or markings of the
Baconian-Cartesian worldview. At best, it amounts to Smart Resource Management’ (p. 51). The
second is Wendell Berry (also cited in Cox, 2014), who is overt in his mistrust of reductionism:
‘Reduction does not necessarily limit itself to compacting and organizing knowledge; it also has the
power to change what is known’ (p. 123). Thus, eco-psychology, which is partially constituted by
its inclusion of alternative epistemologies, pairs extremely well with alternative agricultures, which
also are made up of ways of knowing that go beyond scientistic empiricism and subtle materialism.
1 This author wants to acknowledge that this example is problematic as an example of human interrelationship to the
more-than-human world, given that it involves rats being used in very instrumental ways.