44
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
ensure the distribution of the resources which migrate between the
territory of certain member countries and the high seas. As all member
countries agree to restrict killing of fur seals to the home islands and
to prohibit sealing on the high seas in the Pacific Ocean north of the
30th parallel of latitude north, a portion of the total yield is granted to
those member countries which do not own any islands on which the
seals breed and which otherwise would have no share in the fishery as
a result of their agreement not to engage in sealing on the high seas.
Of the total number of seal skins taken commercially each season on
land, both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. deliver to Canada and Japan
1.5%) each of the gross take in number and value.
The convention setting up the International North Pacific Fisheries
Commission also contains provisions on the subject, as it embodies rules
laying down what is known as the princiFle of abstention. According
to this principle, states not fishing a specific stock in recent years are
required to abstain from fishing this resource when states participating
in the fishcries have created, built up, or restored the resource through
the expenditure of time, effort and money on research and management,
and through restraints on their own fishermen. It should, however, be
scientifically established that the continuing and increasing productivity
of the resource is the result of and dependent on such action by the
participating states, and that the resource is so fully utilized that an
increase in the amount of fishing would not result in any substantial
increase in the sustainable yield.
Most conventions do not, however, prescribe how- the yield from the
resource should be allocated. International fishery bodies have thus to
face this problem at the time of fixing the maximum catch to be taken.
For example, every year since 1961, the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission has recommended the establishment of a total catch
limit of yellowfin tuna in a specified area of the eastern Pacific and the
closure of fishing operations a t such date as the quantity landed plus
the expected landings of vessels a t sea reach an amount slightly less
than the total catch permitted. Under this system, fishing countries
can freely compete for a maximum share within the total limit set by
the Commission. This required, of course, not only the agreement of
member countries but also the co-operation of other countries fishing in
the area. As certain countries would prefer to be allotted a national
quota, efforts are being made to reach a solution.
Antarctic whaling may be cited as an example of a shift from the
principle of free competition within an overall catch limit to the
adoption of national quotas. While for many years the expeditions
from the Antarctic whaling countries took part in what were known as
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
ensure the distribution of the resources which migrate between the
territory of certain member countries and the high seas. As all member
countries agree to restrict killing of fur seals to the home islands and
to prohibit sealing on the high seas in the Pacific Ocean north of the
30th parallel of latitude north, a portion of the total yield is granted to
those member countries which do not own any islands on which the
seals breed and which otherwise would have no share in the fishery as
a result of their agreement not to engage in sealing on the high seas.
Of the total number of seal skins taken commercially each season on
land, both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. deliver to Canada and Japan
1.5%) each of the gross take in number and value.
The convention setting up the International North Pacific Fisheries
Commission also contains provisions on the subject, as it embodies rules
laying down what is known as the princiFle of abstention. According
to this principle, states not fishing a specific stock in recent years are
required to abstain from fishing this resource when states participating
in the fishcries have created, built up, or restored the resource through
the expenditure of time, effort and money on research and management,
and through restraints on their own fishermen. It should, however, be
scientifically established that the continuing and increasing productivity
of the resource is the result of and dependent on such action by the
participating states, and that the resource is so fully utilized that an
increase in the amount of fishing would not result in any substantial
increase in the sustainable yield.
Most conventions do not, however, prescribe how- the yield from the
resource should be allocated. International fishery bodies have thus to
face this problem at the time of fixing the maximum catch to be taken.
For example, every year since 1961, the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission has recommended the establishment of a total catch
limit of yellowfin tuna in a specified area of the eastern Pacific and the
closure of fishing operations a t such date as the quantity landed plus
the expected landings of vessels a t sea reach an amount slightly less
than the total catch permitted. Under this system, fishing countries
can freely compete for a maximum share within the total limit set by
the Commission. This required, of course, not only the agreement of
member countries but also the co-operation of other countries fishing in
the area. As certain countries would prefer to be allotted a national
quota, efforts are being made to reach a solution.
Antarctic whaling may be cited as an example of a shift from the
principle of free competition within an overall catch limit to the
adoption of national quotas. While for many years the expeditions
from the Antarctic whaling countries took part in what were known as