HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
a3
describe . . . distribution”, or McKenzie’s (1936) that “human ecology
deals with the spatial aspects of the . . . relations of human beings and
human institutions”, or that it seeks to “discover the principles and
factors involved in the changing patterns of spatial arrangement”, are
representative of the spatial orientation of two pioneers of human
ecology. These early comments do not appear very different from the
Margalef and Holling statements quoted above. The on-going concern,
in sociological human ecology, with “spatial” and “area” analysis is
illustrated by t h e examples of Hawley (1971), Thomlinson (1969),
Anderson and Egeland (1961) and, of course, Schmid and his colleagues
(1939, 1950, 1958). Of the applied fields, the primary concern of architecture is the creative manipulation of space.
Of significance for human ecology, also, is the innovative work being
done on “the hidden dimension” (space) of man’s behavioral interaction
with his environment. Hall’s (1962, 1966, 1968) work on proxemics and
related topics demands attention here, as does the work on personal
space by Sommer (1959, 1969), Little (1965) and Doxiadis (1968). Of
significance is the work of Hall (1965)) Stea (1965) and Ardrey (1966) on
human territoriality and that of Calhoun (1962) on density and social
pathology.
It seems reasonable that if you can isolate “where” an organism is
located and determine its distributional pattern and the nature of its
spatial interactions, you have proceeded quite a way toward explaining
its relationships with its environment. Distributional limits generally
coincide with some type of environmental change (though obviously on a
gradient rather than abruptly). The situation concerning man is, once
again, much more subtle and complex but it still may be said that
knowing where a person (or group) is located tells an analyst a lot about
relationships with, and attitudes toward, environment. This information
is not, of course, conclusive in human terms, since it is not deterministic
-the subtleties extend far beyond location.
J. A G E S T A L T P E R S P E C T I V E
Some sort of holistic viewpoint, or gestalt perspective, is quite
commonly ascribed to ecology, including human ecology. By a simple
Webster’s definition, the term gestalt refers to a structure or system of
phenomena (physical, biological, or psychological) so integrated as to
constitute a functional unit. (A further implication may be that the
system exhibits properties not derivable from its parts in summation,
which might well be true of the humanistic noosphere.) Some would
claim that such a frame of reference is the one unique attribute of the
ecological method. This approach is epitomized by Rogers and Messinger
a3
describe . . . distribution”, or McKenzie’s (1936) that “human ecology
deals with the spatial aspects of the . . . relations of human beings and
human institutions”, or that it seeks to “discover the principles and
factors involved in the changing patterns of spatial arrangement”, are
representative of the spatial orientation of two pioneers of human
ecology. These early comments do not appear very different from the
Margalef and Holling statements quoted above. The on-going concern,
in sociological human ecology, with “spatial” and “area” analysis is
illustrated by t h e examples of Hawley (1971), Thomlinson (1969),
Anderson and Egeland (1961) and, of course, Schmid and his colleagues
(1939, 1950, 1958). Of the applied fields, the primary concern of architecture is the creative manipulation of space.
Of significance for human ecology, also, is the innovative work being
done on “the hidden dimension” (space) of man’s behavioral interaction
with his environment. Hall’s (1962, 1966, 1968) work on proxemics and
related topics demands attention here, as does the work on personal
space by Sommer (1959, 1969), Little (1965) and Doxiadis (1968). Of
significance is the work of Hall (1965)) Stea (1965) and Ardrey (1966) on
human territoriality and that of Calhoun (1962) on density and social
pathology.
It seems reasonable that if you can isolate “where” an organism is
located and determine its distributional pattern and the nature of its
spatial interactions, you have proceeded quite a way toward explaining
its relationships with its environment. Distributional limits generally
coincide with some type of environmental change (though obviously on a
gradient rather than abruptly). The situation concerning man is, once
again, much more subtle and complex but it still may be said that
knowing where a person (or group) is located tells an analyst a lot about
relationships with, and attitudes toward, environment. This information
is not, of course, conclusive in human terms, since it is not deterministic
-the subtleties extend far beyond location.
J. A G E S T A L T P E R S P E C T I V E
Some sort of holistic viewpoint, or gestalt perspective, is quite
commonly ascribed to ecology, including human ecology. By a simple
Webster’s definition, the term gestalt refers to a structure or system of
phenomena (physical, biological, or psychological) so integrated as to
constitute a functional unit. (A further implication may be that the
system exhibits properties not derivable from its parts in summation,
which might well be true of the humanistic noosphere.) Some would
claim that such a frame of reference is the one unique attribute of the
ecological method. This approach is epitomized by Rogers and Messinger