HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
77
have the mathematical expertise adequately to argue the point, but
would suggest that most of the ecological formulations derived by
biologists are too concrete and too simple to be directly applicable to
human systems. Many of them are based on physical exchanges of
matter or energy which, while perhaps applicable to man, do not go far
toward explaining the totality of the complexities of his ecological
systems. Ecosystem analysis applied to human beings must be much
more subtle. This is based on the belief that systems are definable
primarily by the interaction process and that this process, in humans, is
much more abstract and symbolic. As Blumer (1969) has pointed out,
human interaction is symbolic interaction, this depending on the
assumption that “human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them; this meaning . . . is derived
from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s
fellows; these meanings are handled in and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he
encounters”. An adequate analysis of human ecosystems based on such
assumptions would, then, have to include some measure of the interpretative process to arrive at adequate understanding of the meaning of
interaction. Whether or not these perceptual screens that separate
people from their environment can be quantified is central to the ability
to quantify human ecosystems.
Ecological systems differ from the usual definition of general systems
in at least two important ways. First, an ecological system must include
life; the presence of some kind of organism is implicit. (Amen, 1966).
Secondly, there is no such thing as a “closed” ecological system, while
such is a commonly accepted form of a general system.
It is important to remember the first idea-because part of the promise
of an ecological approach is its potential for helping to reclaim for man a
meaningful relationship with his environment. A general systems
approach, with all its validity and whatever its contribution, could
return us to a discarded mechanistic focus, ignoring the reality of man.
Formalizing systems to the extreme, i.e. assuming absolutely operable
laws of systems behavior, might cause us to neglect the organism, to
dehumanize our analyses. If this happens, then once again the solution
becomes the problem and the ecological study of man has no bearing as
a potential corrective.
The second consideration, that of open versus closed, requires further
examination. The situation is confused by commonly accepted definitions of “open” and “closed” systems, such as those of Forrester (1968).
He considers an open system as one “characterized by outputs that
respond to inputs but where the outputs are isolated from and have no
influence on the inputs”, i.e. it has no self-adjusting mechanism. His
77
have the mathematical expertise adequately to argue the point, but
would suggest that most of the ecological formulations derived by
biologists are too concrete and too simple to be directly applicable to
human systems. Many of them are based on physical exchanges of
matter or energy which, while perhaps applicable to man, do not go far
toward explaining the totality of the complexities of his ecological
systems. Ecosystem analysis applied to human beings must be much
more subtle. This is based on the belief that systems are definable
primarily by the interaction process and that this process, in humans, is
much more abstract and symbolic. As Blumer (1969) has pointed out,
human interaction is symbolic interaction, this depending on the
assumption that “human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them; this meaning . . . is derived
from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s
fellows; these meanings are handled in and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he
encounters”. An adequate analysis of human ecosystems based on such
assumptions would, then, have to include some measure of the interpretative process to arrive at adequate understanding of the meaning of
interaction. Whether or not these perceptual screens that separate
people from their environment can be quantified is central to the ability
to quantify human ecosystems.
Ecological systems differ from the usual definition of general systems
in at least two important ways. First, an ecological system must include
life; the presence of some kind of organism is implicit. (Amen, 1966).
Secondly, there is no such thing as a “closed” ecological system, while
such is a commonly accepted form of a general system.
It is important to remember the first idea-because part of the promise
of an ecological approach is its potential for helping to reclaim for man a
meaningful relationship with his environment. A general systems
approach, with all its validity and whatever its contribution, could
return us to a discarded mechanistic focus, ignoring the reality of man.
Formalizing systems to the extreme, i.e. assuming absolutely operable
laws of systems behavior, might cause us to neglect the organism, to
dehumanize our analyses. If this happens, then once again the solution
becomes the problem and the ecological study of man has no bearing as
a potential corrective.
The second consideration, that of open versus closed, requires further
examination. The situation is confused by commonly accepted definitions of “open” and “closed” systems, such as those of Forrester (1968).
He considers an open system as one “characterized by outputs that
respond to inputs but where the outputs are isolated from and have no
influence on the inputs”, i.e. it has no self-adjusting mechanism. His