HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
67
of the interaction between two or more human beings”. He strongly
asserts, however, that this does not reduce the concept, in a theoretical
context, to a simplistic notion, but that it is a complex theory with a
long, complicated and slowly emerging history in modern social science.
There is room here for only a brief review; the reader is referred to
Parsons (1968) for a much expanded but clearly presented history and
to Carrothers (1956) for an able tracing of the mathematical development of the gravity and potential concepts of human interaction.
Parsons begins his historical review with certain modern philosophical
views in the Cartesian schema of relationship and differentiation.
Descartes treated the significant external world as the physical world,
i.e. as not concerned with interplay, since physical objects are assumed
immobile. The important point, however, is that the Cartesian schema
did allow for a process of differentiation-“it formulated a relational
scheme”, even if the process was unidirectional.
From this beginning, the evolving conceptualization of interaction
moved through the utilitarian differentiation of Hobbes and Locke,
meaning redefinition toward inclusion of goal-directed actions as rational
manipulation of the external world. Kant and the idealistic movement
attempted to move one step further by analyzing the given entity (“I”)
on the subject side of the relationship; the first two approaches concentrated on the object or receiver side of the equation, accepting the
subject side as given.
Gradually developing during this slow clarification of the interaction
process were attempts to differentiate between the role of the individual
and that of the group, however defined. This dualism was most sharply
noted in the Hegelian derivation of the idealistic differentiation of
subject; the individual acted freely and rationally. Marxism, resulting
in part from the firming of economics and psychology, established the
interaction system in terms of conditional materialism, rather than the
idealistic relationship of thinking man to the external world. In other
words, Marx felt that man’s practical needs and wants were the
conditioning factors of his behavior patterns, his interaction with the
real world.
Also central to the developing concept of human behavior in terms of
conditions of interaction was the two-fold problem of limitations on
action: “the biological, conceived of in terms of heredity and environment; and the cultural, conceived of as a symbolically defined system of
order with normative primacy, to which men are obligated to conform”
(Parsons, 1968). This problem is still central to the ecological study of
man: “how [can] the essential components of human [interaction
systems] be treated in a manner . . . realistic about the continuity
between human nature and the organic world”.
67
of the interaction between two or more human beings”. He strongly
asserts, however, that this does not reduce the concept, in a theoretical
context, to a simplistic notion, but that it is a complex theory with a
long, complicated and slowly emerging history in modern social science.
There is room here for only a brief review; the reader is referred to
Parsons (1968) for a much expanded but clearly presented history and
to Carrothers (1956) for an able tracing of the mathematical development of the gravity and potential concepts of human interaction.
Parsons begins his historical review with certain modern philosophical
views in the Cartesian schema of relationship and differentiation.
Descartes treated the significant external world as the physical world,
i.e. as not concerned with interplay, since physical objects are assumed
immobile. The important point, however, is that the Cartesian schema
did allow for a process of differentiation-“it formulated a relational
scheme”, even if the process was unidirectional.
From this beginning, the evolving conceptualization of interaction
moved through the utilitarian differentiation of Hobbes and Locke,
meaning redefinition toward inclusion of goal-directed actions as rational
manipulation of the external world. Kant and the idealistic movement
attempted to move one step further by analyzing the given entity (“I”)
on the subject side of the relationship; the first two approaches concentrated on the object or receiver side of the equation, accepting the
subject side as given.
Gradually developing during this slow clarification of the interaction
process were attempts to differentiate between the role of the individual
and that of the group, however defined. This dualism was most sharply
noted in the Hegelian derivation of the idealistic differentiation of
subject; the individual acted freely and rationally. Marxism, resulting
in part from the firming of economics and psychology, established the
interaction system in terms of conditional materialism, rather than the
idealistic relationship of thinking man to the external world. In other
words, Marx felt that man’s practical needs and wants were the
conditioning factors of his behavior patterns, his interaction with the
real world.
Also central to the developing concept of human behavior in terms of
conditions of interaction was the two-fold problem of limitations on
action: “the biological, conceived of in terms of heredity and environment; and the cultural, conceived of as a symbolically defined system of
order with normative primacy, to which men are obligated to conform”
(Parsons, 1968). This problem is still central to the ecological study of
man: “how [can] the essential components of human [interaction
systems] be treated in a manner . . . realistic about the continuity
between human nature and the organic world”.