HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
65
The individual may react to this bombardment in one of two ways: first,
he may transcend the confines of the real world open to him as a result
of his immediate involvement ratios and expand his concern for the
well-being of those with whom he interacts to a concern for all mankind.
Or he may be unable to comprehend the complexity of the bombardment with a resultant tendency to distinguish all contacts and interactions (beyond those of immediate personal worth, those of an in-depth
nature) as superficial and unimportant. In other words, instead of his
concern expanding, it might even regress with the multitude of contacts
held cheaply and reacted to with carelessness. Too many contacts
cheapen all.
The paradox for man is that either of these reactions can create an
imbalance with resultant alienation, anomie, and perhaps even anarchy.
The challenge for human ecology is clear: how do we achieve a functional
sense of community on a small scale to attain a sense of identity, a
feeling of belonging in people and, a t the same time, achieve a transcendental view for each individual as citizen in a world community so
that Luther’s h m o hmini lupus (man is a wolf to man) will end and
cooperation for the benefit of all will be achieved, as it must be if man is
to prosper.
D. D I V E R S I T Y A N D S T A B I L I T Y
Man tends to simplify the ecosystem; this is true in his mono-cultural
farming and in his suburbs (Darling, 1962). Man also has a habit of
introducing foreign objects into the system and of not controlling waste
discharge, both of which are circulated into and through the system and
likely to upset natural balances of nutrition and absorption capabilities.
Man apparently continues to encourage unchecked growth, with the
resultant implications for instability. Other examples (perhaps to
i n h i t y ) could be cited of his impact on the diversity and stability of
human and natural ecological systems.
Discussion of this in the literature is best developed in the Brookhaven
Symposia in Biology edited by Woodwell and Smith (1969). Holling
(1969) for example (in the aforementioned symposia) discusses the
relationship between ecological and social systems in terms of stability.
Apart from the separation implying that social systems are not ecological systems, his four-point list of properties identical to both is quite
acceptable: both exhibit high diversity; both have a “profoundly
important and distinctive historical character”; both exhibit important
spatial attributes; and both exhibit a variety of structural properties.
Caldwell (1969) presents a case for the need for “society . . . to stabilize
its relationship to its environment”, what he calls “societal homeostasis
65
The individual may react to this bombardment in one of two ways: first,
he may transcend the confines of the real world open to him as a result
of his immediate involvement ratios and expand his concern for the
well-being of those with whom he interacts to a concern for all mankind.
Or he may be unable to comprehend the complexity of the bombardment with a resultant tendency to distinguish all contacts and interactions (beyond those of immediate personal worth, those of an in-depth
nature) as superficial and unimportant. In other words, instead of his
concern expanding, it might even regress with the multitude of contacts
held cheaply and reacted to with carelessness. Too many contacts
cheapen all.
The paradox for man is that either of these reactions can create an
imbalance with resultant alienation, anomie, and perhaps even anarchy.
The challenge for human ecology is clear: how do we achieve a functional
sense of community on a small scale to attain a sense of identity, a
feeling of belonging in people and, a t the same time, achieve a transcendental view for each individual as citizen in a world community so
that Luther’s h m o hmini lupus (man is a wolf to man) will end and
cooperation for the benefit of all will be achieved, as it must be if man is
to prosper.
D. D I V E R S I T Y A N D S T A B I L I T Y
Man tends to simplify the ecosystem; this is true in his mono-cultural
farming and in his suburbs (Darling, 1962). Man also has a habit of
introducing foreign objects into the system and of not controlling waste
discharge, both of which are circulated into and through the system and
likely to upset natural balances of nutrition and absorption capabilities.
Man apparently continues to encourage unchecked growth, with the
resultant implications for instability. Other examples (perhaps to
i n h i t y ) could be cited of his impact on the diversity and stability of
human and natural ecological systems.
Discussion of this in the literature is best developed in the Brookhaven
Symposia in Biology edited by Woodwell and Smith (1969). Holling
(1969) for example (in the aforementioned symposia) discusses the
relationship between ecological and social systems in terms of stability.
Apart from the separation implying that social systems are not ecological systems, his four-point list of properties identical to both is quite
acceptable: both exhibit high diversity; both have a “profoundly
important and distinctive historical character”; both exhibit important
spatial attributes; and both exhibit a variety of structural properties.
Caldwell (1969) presents a case for the need for “society . . . to stabilize
its relationship to its environment”, what he calls “societal homeostasis