HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
63
imply that man’s sense of responsibility to other men, to other biota,
and to environment, is limited by the extent of his functional involvement, by the limits to that which he accepts as functionally real. All
Vietnamese (and most American) soldiers are unreal, the war is unreal,
to those of us at home in the States. Pollution in the Ruhr (or Los
Angeles) is unreal to people in Boston. The extinction of the Condor is
difficult to become excited about because the Condor is unreal and
(because of enforced isolation) can never become real. These are all, of
course, very real phenomena, with very real impact, but they lie outside
of experiential or perceived reality (the functional reality) for the
majority of people, with a resulting lack of concern.
Early in the paper, particular emphasis was given to functionalism as
a central concern in anthropology. Though most evident there, the use
of function as a guiding principle, as a limiting factor of interaction, is
common to all human ecology. Parsons (1968) concurs, with his claim
that “function . . . applies to social systems, as to all . . . living systems”.
He goes on to define functional problems as “those concerning the
conditions of the maintenance and/or development of the interchanges
with environing systems, both inputs from them and outputs to them”.
Elsewhere in sociology, Duncan and Schnore (1959) provide what they
consider a “coherent statement of functionalist principles” to the ecological study of society with their conception of “ecological structure
. . . conceived as an organization of functions-activities that are
dependent upon other activities”.
Parsons (1951) has established a set of what he calls “the functional
prerequisites of social systems”; his work in this respect is referred to
frequently in the literature of human ecology. He asserts that if “a
system is to constitute a persistent order or to undergo an orderly
process of developmental change, certain functional prerequisites must
be met”. He bases this on the idea that action systems are structured
about three “integrative foci”, the individual actor, the interactive
system, and a system of cultural patterning: “each implies the others
and therefore the variability of any one is limited by its compatibility
with the minimum conditions of functioning of each of the other two”.
Mulkay’s (1971) concern with functionalism was established earlier in
this paper (in the sociological section). Beshers’ (1962) overt attempt to
bridge the concepts of “ecology and functionalism” is recommended for
further details of the relationship. Willems (1965) in psychology, defines
the functional approach by defining the environment, in the ecological
orientation to psychology as “that total set of factors that can activate
behavior”, i.e. the functional environment. The Sprouts (1965) provided
a functional perspective on decision-making in political ecology with
their insistence that “environing conditions and events can affect
63
imply that man’s sense of responsibility to other men, to other biota,
and to environment, is limited by the extent of his functional involvement, by the limits to that which he accepts as functionally real. All
Vietnamese (and most American) soldiers are unreal, the war is unreal,
to those of us at home in the States. Pollution in the Ruhr (or Los
Angeles) is unreal to people in Boston. The extinction of the Condor is
difficult to become excited about because the Condor is unreal and
(because of enforced isolation) can never become real. These are all, of
course, very real phenomena, with very real impact, but they lie outside
of experiential or perceived reality (the functional reality) for the
majority of people, with a resulting lack of concern.
Early in the paper, particular emphasis was given to functionalism as
a central concern in anthropology. Though most evident there, the use
of function as a guiding principle, as a limiting factor of interaction, is
common to all human ecology. Parsons (1968) concurs, with his claim
that “function . . . applies to social systems, as to all . . . living systems”.
He goes on to define functional problems as “those concerning the
conditions of the maintenance and/or development of the interchanges
with environing systems, both inputs from them and outputs to them”.
Elsewhere in sociology, Duncan and Schnore (1959) provide what they
consider a “coherent statement of functionalist principles” to the ecological study of society with their conception of “ecological structure
. . . conceived as an organization of functions-activities that are
dependent upon other activities”.
Parsons (1951) has established a set of what he calls “the functional
prerequisites of social systems”; his work in this respect is referred to
frequently in the literature of human ecology. He asserts that if “a
system is to constitute a persistent order or to undergo an orderly
process of developmental change, certain functional prerequisites must
be met”. He bases this on the idea that action systems are structured
about three “integrative foci”, the individual actor, the interactive
system, and a system of cultural patterning: “each implies the others
and therefore the variability of any one is limited by its compatibility
with the minimum conditions of functioning of each of the other two”.
Mulkay’s (1971) concern with functionalism was established earlier in
this paper (in the sociological section). Beshers’ (1962) overt attempt to
bridge the concepts of “ecology and functionalism” is recommended for
further details of the relationship. Willems (1965) in psychology, defines
the functional approach by defining the environment, in the ecological
orientation to psychology as “that total set of factors that can activate
behavior”, i.e. the functional environment. The Sprouts (1965) provided
a functional perspective on decision-making in political ecology with
their insistence that “environing conditions and events can affect