HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
33
dominant part”. A similar statement was sounded by Ackerman
(1965) to the effect that the central problem to which geographers should
address themselves is analysis of “the vast overriding system comprised
by man and the natural environment”. Geographers are beginning
attempts to integrate the time-honored, centrist, regional concept with
ecology (cf. Dickinson, 1947, 1970). Christiansen (1967) suggests that
“ecosystems may be used as models in modern regional geography”.
The modern era (if it may be so called) of attempts to apply the ideas
of ecology in geography is generally considered to have begun with
Barrows’ (1923) famous presidential address to the Association of
American Geographers. But as Fuchs (1967) points out, the Barrows
attempt was preceded by others, particularly by Dryer (1920) in an
earlier presidential address. Fuchs emphasizes that Barrows’ statement
“can no longer be considered as isolated as most geographers regard it”.
This isolation, the reaction to a misguided fear of “determinism”,
resulted in a neglect of ecological concepts in geographical methodology
for the better part of half a century. Zelinsky (1970) and many others
now recognize the ecosystem as possibly “the most epochal discovery of
recent years”, but Barrows surely anticipated the importance of some
such sort of system with his comment that “the center of geography is
the study of human ecology in specific areas”. One could write a worse
definition of ecosystem (in human terms, that is). He later broadens what
could be considered his definition of ecosystem by again suggesting the
importance of viewing “the life of nations and of communities in relation
to their environments” as an “indispensable prerequisite to understanding their problems and their attitudes”.
The main objection to Barrows’ ideas, then and now, is that the
approach is claimed to be deterministic. Careful reading of his paper on
my part convinces me of equal care on his part to avoid the taint of
determinism. I think that the continuing fear of “neo-determinism” is
still keeping geography from active involvement in one of the most
exciting and far-reaching movements in the history of scholarship.
A sort of ecological stream of thought has been maintained in geography, however, despite the failure of Barrows’ attempt at redefinition.
This maintenance was achieved through the primacy of the poles-apart
approaches of Semple (1911) and Sauer (e.g. 1945, 1947, 1948, 1952,
1956, 1958). Many thinkers in the discipline concerned with its history,
philosophy, and methodology consider these approaches as differing
kinds of determinism: Semple’s environmental determinism and Sauer’s
cultural determinism. English (1968) has provided the best description
by noting that each approach involves one active and one inert segment.
Semple’s environmental determinism involves “active man acting on an
inert environment”. English claims that the environmentalists “saw a
33
dominant part”. A similar statement was sounded by Ackerman
(1965) to the effect that the central problem to which geographers should
address themselves is analysis of “the vast overriding system comprised
by man and the natural environment”. Geographers are beginning
attempts to integrate the time-honored, centrist, regional concept with
ecology (cf. Dickinson, 1947, 1970). Christiansen (1967) suggests that
“ecosystems may be used as models in modern regional geography”.
The modern era (if it may be so called) of attempts to apply the ideas
of ecology in geography is generally considered to have begun with
Barrows’ (1923) famous presidential address to the Association of
American Geographers. But as Fuchs (1967) points out, the Barrows
attempt was preceded by others, particularly by Dryer (1920) in an
earlier presidential address. Fuchs emphasizes that Barrows’ statement
“can no longer be considered as isolated as most geographers regard it”.
This isolation, the reaction to a misguided fear of “determinism”,
resulted in a neglect of ecological concepts in geographical methodology
for the better part of half a century. Zelinsky (1970) and many others
now recognize the ecosystem as possibly “the most epochal discovery of
recent years”, but Barrows surely anticipated the importance of some
such sort of system with his comment that “the center of geography is
the study of human ecology in specific areas”. One could write a worse
definition of ecosystem (in human terms, that is). He later broadens what
could be considered his definition of ecosystem by again suggesting the
importance of viewing “the life of nations and of communities in relation
to their environments” as an “indispensable prerequisite to understanding their problems and their attitudes”.
The main objection to Barrows’ ideas, then and now, is that the
approach is claimed to be deterministic. Careful reading of his paper on
my part convinces me of equal care on his part to avoid the taint of
determinism. I think that the continuing fear of “neo-determinism” is
still keeping geography from active involvement in one of the most
exciting and far-reaching movements in the history of scholarship.
A sort of ecological stream of thought has been maintained in geography, however, despite the failure of Barrows’ attempt at redefinition.
This maintenance was achieved through the primacy of the poles-apart
approaches of Semple (1911) and Sauer (e.g. 1945, 1947, 1948, 1952,
1956, 1958). Many thinkers in the discipline concerned with its history,
philosophy, and methodology consider these approaches as differing
kinds of determinism: Semple’s environmental determinism and Sauer’s
cultural determinism. English (1968) has provided the best description
by noting that each approach involves one active and one inert segment.
Semple’s environmental determinism involves “active man acting on an
inert environment”. English claims that the environmentalists “saw a