26
GERALD L. YOUNG
definition. Proshansky et al. (1970) would like the definition limited to
“the relationship between human behavior and the man-ordered and
man-defined environment”. By man-defined, they mean specifically
environments that have in some way been modified by man. They also
construct other limits to environmental/ecological psychology (and to
environmental sciences in general-of which environmental psychology
is considered an integral part): origin in pressing social problems; of a
multi-disciplinary nature; and man included as an integral part of every
problem are all conditions limiting the scope of ecological psychology.
Other problems and contradictions are apparent. The most obvious
one is that of common terminology (see English and English, 1958).
Different interpretations of similar terms and phrases is a significant
problem throughout human ecology, a problem that inhibits integration
of the various approaches into a truly interdisciplinary concept (rather
than the present multi-disciplinary). The problem is particularly crucial
in psychology: for ecologists in other disciplines who attempt to read in
ecological psychology, as well as for psychologists who cannot seem to
come to agreement on acceptable definitions. (For non-psychological
ecologists, particularly, when familiar terms appear slightly shifted in
meaning or (sometimes) used in what seems to be a redundant fashion.)
It is not possible to explore this problem completely, but two startling
examples especially deserve mention: the psyohologists’ use of the terms
“physical” environment and of “ecological” environment. Physical
environment, to most ecologists, means the physical components of the
natural world, such things as rocks, soils, climate, and including, in
some contexts, the biota. Ecological psychologists use the term to mean
an environment made up of the physical presence of such things as
tables, chairs, walls, other people, etc. (Proshansky et al., 1970). They
also use for the same idea the term physical setting, which seems much
more acceptable because such usage does not have a previously (widely)
accepted connotation and is in fact widely used to mean exactly what
the psychologists intend it to mean: the tables, chairs, etc. surrounding
an individual. The same criticism could be directed at the use in
psychology of the term “natural” or “naturally occurring contexts”
because the same conflict in meaning is present.
The term “ecological environment” appears confusing and redundant:
every environment is ecological. The term is meaningless, in an ecological sense, in any context. Yet it is found repeatedly in the literature
of ecological psychology. Psychologists apparently use it to mean any
environmental complex external to the individual, subject to the three
clarifications (2) noted above from Barker.
Another problem is whether or not psychologists wish to use behavioral
characteristics, psychological environment, or “life-space” as a defining
GERALD L. YOUNG
definition. Proshansky et al. (1970) would like the definition limited to
“the relationship between human behavior and the man-ordered and
man-defined environment”. By man-defined, they mean specifically
environments that have in some way been modified by man. They also
construct other limits to environmental/ecological psychology (and to
environmental sciences in general-of which environmental psychology
is considered an integral part): origin in pressing social problems; of a
multi-disciplinary nature; and man included as an integral part of every
problem are all conditions limiting the scope of ecological psychology.
Other problems and contradictions are apparent. The most obvious
one is that of common terminology (see English and English, 1958).
Different interpretations of similar terms and phrases is a significant
problem throughout human ecology, a problem that inhibits integration
of the various approaches into a truly interdisciplinary concept (rather
than the present multi-disciplinary). The problem is particularly crucial
in psychology: for ecologists in other disciplines who attempt to read in
ecological psychology, as well as for psychologists who cannot seem to
come to agreement on acceptable definitions. (For non-psychological
ecologists, particularly, when familiar terms appear slightly shifted in
meaning or (sometimes) used in what seems to be a redundant fashion.)
It is not possible to explore this problem completely, but two startling
examples especially deserve mention: the psyohologists’ use of the terms
“physical” environment and of “ecological” environment. Physical
environment, to most ecologists, means the physical components of the
natural world, such things as rocks, soils, climate, and including, in
some contexts, the biota. Ecological psychologists use the term to mean
an environment made up of the physical presence of such things as
tables, chairs, walls, other people, etc. (Proshansky et al., 1970). They
also use for the same idea the term physical setting, which seems much
more acceptable because such usage does not have a previously (widely)
accepted connotation and is in fact widely used to mean exactly what
the psychologists intend it to mean: the tables, chairs, etc. surrounding
an individual. The same criticism could be directed at the use in
psychology of the term “natural” or “naturally occurring contexts”
because the same conflict in meaning is present.
The term “ecological environment” appears confusing and redundant:
every environment is ecological. The term is meaningless, in an ecological sense, in any context. Yet it is found repeatedly in the literature
of ecological psychology. Psychologists apparently use it to mean any
environmental complex external to the individual, subject to the three
clarifications (2) noted above from Barker.
Another problem is whether or not psychologists wish to use behavioral
characteristics, psychological environment, or “life-space” as a defining