HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
15
man to environment: the first cooperative organization, the second
competitive.
McKenzie (1926) described the task of the human ecologist as studying the processes of change that shape the “spatial and sustenance
relations in which human beings are organized”. Mukerjee (1 932c) also
noted one task of human ecologists as the investigation of “the spatial
and food relations in which human beings and activities are organized
. . . in terms of the ensemble of ecological organization”. Hawley (1944)
suggests that “out of the adaptive strivings of aggregated individuals
there develops . . . an organization of interdependencies which constitutes . . . a coherent functional entity”. Form (1954) urges ecologists to
abandon their “sub-social non-organization orientations and use the
frame of reference of general sociology”, i.e. the study of social organizations.
Structure is often treated as a dependent variable in human ecology,
starting again with Durkheim and continuing with contemporary
ecologists whom Schnore (1958) describes as attempting “to identify the
factors determining variations in structure”. Hawley’s (1950) book
concentrates on “a fundamental yet long neglected sociological problem,
namely the nature and development of community structure”. Here,
structure (to tie it with organization) is viewed as a collective adaptation
of an organized population t o its total environment. This emphasis
continues through the attempt by Gibbs and Martin (1959) to oonstruct
a theoretical system of human ecology by strongly emphasizing “the
different forms of sustenance organization”; here organization is limited
to the structured pattern of sustenance activities, those activities undertaken to provide a livelihood. Human ecology is so limited by Gibbs and
Martin because they consider the overriding concern of most societies to
be with what they call “selective survival, the cornerstone of most
ecological theory”. Duncan (1961) describes as a “working assumption”
in human ecology that the human community is made up of activities
organized in physical space. Another group of sooiologists whom
Willhelm (1964) called “voluntarists” reject materialism as unrealistic
but still emphasize organization, demanding that “ecologists seek
explanation solely in man’s social organization”. Even Willhelm, who
considers himself attacking the concept of the “ecological complex”, is
not criticizing the idea of an organized, ecological complex so much
as the vagueness with which it is defined, the dependence on external
“physical” factors for purposes of action limitation, and indifference
toward social values. Hollingshead (1947) as a “voluntarist” had earlier
rejected the same things: emphasis on competition at a sub-social level
and ignorance of the influence of cultural and social evaluations. He
substituted the idea that “men live within a socio-cultural construct
15
man to environment: the first cooperative organization, the second
competitive.
McKenzie (1926) described the task of the human ecologist as studying the processes of change that shape the “spatial and sustenance
relations in which human beings are organized”. Mukerjee (1 932c) also
noted one task of human ecologists as the investigation of “the spatial
and food relations in which human beings and activities are organized
. . . in terms of the ensemble of ecological organization”. Hawley (1944)
suggests that “out of the adaptive strivings of aggregated individuals
there develops . . . an organization of interdependencies which constitutes . . . a coherent functional entity”. Form (1954) urges ecologists to
abandon their “sub-social non-organization orientations and use the
frame of reference of general sociology”, i.e. the study of social organizations.
Structure is often treated as a dependent variable in human ecology,
starting again with Durkheim and continuing with contemporary
ecologists whom Schnore (1958) describes as attempting “to identify the
factors determining variations in structure”. Hawley’s (1950) book
concentrates on “a fundamental yet long neglected sociological problem,
namely the nature and development of community structure”. Here,
structure (to tie it with organization) is viewed as a collective adaptation
of an organized population t o its total environment. This emphasis
continues through the attempt by Gibbs and Martin (1959) to oonstruct
a theoretical system of human ecology by strongly emphasizing “the
different forms of sustenance organization”; here organization is limited
to the structured pattern of sustenance activities, those activities undertaken to provide a livelihood. Human ecology is so limited by Gibbs and
Martin because they consider the overriding concern of most societies to
be with what they call “selective survival, the cornerstone of most
ecological theory”. Duncan (1961) describes as a “working assumption”
in human ecology that the human community is made up of activities
organized in physical space. Another group of sooiologists whom
Willhelm (1964) called “voluntarists” reject materialism as unrealistic
but still emphasize organization, demanding that “ecologists seek
explanation solely in man’s social organization”. Even Willhelm, who
considers himself attacking the concept of the “ecological complex”, is
not criticizing the idea of an organized, ecological complex so much
as the vagueness with which it is defined, the dependence on external
“physical” factors for purposes of action limitation, and indifference
toward social values. Hollingshead (1947) as a “voluntarist” had earlier
rejected the same things: emphasis on competition at a sub-social level
and ignorance of the influence of cultural and social evaluations. He
substituted the idea that “men live within a socio-cultural construct