238
J. HESLOP-HARRISON
of nomenclature adequate to the task of conveying precise information
regarding their defined limits, relationships, variability and dynamic
structure’ ’.
By definition, as well as etymologically, experimental taxonomy and
biosystematics thus relate to a discipline that is part of taxonomy in the
broad sense, which genecology is not. The distinction is no trivial one,
since it is now possible to see that a conflict of purposes among students
of infraspecific variation in plants has been a continuing source of dispute. Writing with the problems of evolutionary processes in mind,
Epling and Catlin (1950) deplore the “conceptual error” which they
state has led some workers to express “. . . the inter-relation between
population and environment by typification and classification rather
than by consideration of the adaptive relations of the interbreeding
individuals.” What these authors fail here to acknowledge is that to
attempt this type of classification is it respectable enough activity when
the purpose of a study i s taxonomic. Conversely, the reservations
voiced by Turrill (1938, 1946) about the contribution of genecology to
taxonomy are those to be expected from a taxonomist who finds genecological aims and concepts incompatible, in part at least, with the process
of perfecting a general system of classification and nomenclature.
Biosystematics (or experimental taxonomy) should accordingly be
preserved as something distinct from genecology in so far as there is a
difference of aims. Re-definitions of biosystematics which have the
effect of making the word practically synonymous with genecology
(such as that of Clausen et al., 1945) are therefore undesirable.
This is not, of course, to argue that genecological and biosystematic
aims cannot be pursued at one and the same time in any particular
study of infraspecific variation, but simply to urge that if they are, they
should be recognized as not being identical. Because the purposes of
study are different, different kinds of evidence are required. Thus, ecological data and observations on genetic systems are a sine qua n o n of
genecology, although by no means an essential part of taxonomy. Conversely, the nomenclatural and bibliographical studies which are an
obligatory part of any taxonomic study are not necessarily significant
for a genecological investigation of a species.
If the taxonomic aspects of genecology have often been over-emphasized, it is equally true that the genetical and physiological phases
have been as frequently understressed. Baker’s regret (1953) that so few
studies of race differentiation up to that time had paid adequate attention to the role of breeding systems is less warranted now that publication of his own papers and Stebbins’ fine “Variation and Evolution in
Plants” (1950) have alerted authors to the importance of this and other
genetical factors, but it is still true that genecological or near-geneco-
J. HESLOP-HARRISON
of nomenclature adequate to the task of conveying precise information
regarding their defined limits, relationships, variability and dynamic
structure’ ’.
By definition, as well as etymologically, experimental taxonomy and
biosystematics thus relate to a discipline that is part of taxonomy in the
broad sense, which genecology is not. The distinction is no trivial one,
since it is now possible to see that a conflict of purposes among students
of infraspecific variation in plants has been a continuing source of dispute. Writing with the problems of evolutionary processes in mind,
Epling and Catlin (1950) deplore the “conceptual error” which they
state has led some workers to express “. . . the inter-relation between
population and environment by typification and classification rather
than by consideration of the adaptive relations of the interbreeding
individuals.” What these authors fail here to acknowledge is that to
attempt this type of classification is it respectable enough activity when
the purpose of a study i s taxonomic. Conversely, the reservations
voiced by Turrill (1938, 1946) about the contribution of genecology to
taxonomy are those to be expected from a taxonomist who finds genecological aims and concepts incompatible, in part at least, with the process
of perfecting a general system of classification and nomenclature.
Biosystematics (or experimental taxonomy) should accordingly be
preserved as something distinct from genecology in so far as there is a
difference of aims. Re-definitions of biosystematics which have the
effect of making the word practically synonymous with genecology
(such as that of Clausen et al., 1945) are therefore undesirable.
This is not, of course, to argue that genecological and biosystematic
aims cannot be pursued at one and the same time in any particular
study of infraspecific variation, but simply to urge that if they are, they
should be recognized as not being identical. Because the purposes of
study are different, different kinds of evidence are required. Thus, ecological data and observations on genetic systems are a sine qua n o n of
genecology, although by no means an essential part of taxonomy. Conversely, the nomenclatural and bibliographical studies which are an
obligatory part of any taxonomic study are not necessarily significant
for a genecological investigation of a species.
If the taxonomic aspects of genecology have often been over-emphasized, it is equally true that the genetical and physiological phases
have been as frequently understressed. Baker’s regret (1953) that so few
studies of race differentiation up to that time had paid adequate attention to the role of breeding systems is less warranted now that publication of his own papers and Stebbins’ fine “Variation and Evolution in
Plants” (1950) have alerted authors to the importance of this and other
genetical factors, but it is still true that genecological or near-geneco-