TWENTIETH CENTURY EMBRYOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
37
Brunelleschi there was no Bramante; his architecture was not Bramante's unachieved, but his own fulfilled. His purpose led to the purpose of Bramante: they were not on that account the same" (1954, p.
134).
The question is worthy of brief examination, not only because it is an
interesting one as raised in its own right by Scott, but because, ironically,
so many of the new young generation of scientists belittle the historical
approach, just at the very time when history has learned to traffic as
profitably in ideas as in events. Scott claims, in his own words, that "the
values of art do not lie in the sequence but in the individual terms"
(Scott, 1954). It cannot be denied that for the growth of science as of
art the study of a succession of past changes can never substitute for the
creative impulse that itself creates change. But neither can it be denied,
for science or for art, that the new creativity is always somehow related
to the old. Insofar as the whole essence of science is that it builds
upon what has been built before, the new and the old become inseparable.
What Scott has failed to remember, in his treatment of the biological
fallacy, is that biology has exploded a fallacy of its own, namely, the one
which used to be embodied in the now no longer tenable biogenetic
law. What Scott has perhaps been thinking about is the phylogeny of
ideas, not their ontogeny. In embryology, we now consider ontogeny to
be responsible for phylogeny, rather than the reverse. If we can continue
to see value in studying the ontogeny, not the phylogeny, of ideas, by
concentrating on this we not only avoid the pitfall of Scott's biological
fallacy, but we furthermore place ourselves in a position in which we can
judge our own creative contributions from at least an improved, if not yet
an ideal, point of perspective. It has just been said above, that the study
of a succession of past changes can never substitute for the creative
impulse; it can, however, in the best event, guide it. As the foremost
experimentalist of us all has predicted, "Die Universalmethode des
causalen Anatomen wird ebensowenig die Anwendung des Messers wie
des Farbstoffes oder des Maasses, sondern die Geistesanatomie, das
analytische, caúsale Denken sein" (Roux, 1885a, pp. 22-23).
REFERENCES
Andrews, G. F. 1897a. Some spinning activities of protoplasm in starfish and
Echinus eggs. /. Morphol. 12: 367-389.
Andrews, G. F. 1897b. The living substance as such: and as organism. /.
Morphol 12, Suppl. No. 2: 1-176.
Baker, J. R. 1948. The cell-theory: a restatement, history, and critique. Part I.
Quart. J. Microscop. Set. 89: 103-125.
37
Brunelleschi there was no Bramante; his architecture was not Bramante's unachieved, but his own fulfilled. His purpose led to the purpose of Bramante: they were not on that account the same" (1954, p.
134).
The question is worthy of brief examination, not only because it is an
interesting one as raised in its own right by Scott, but because, ironically,
so many of the new young generation of scientists belittle the historical
approach, just at the very time when history has learned to traffic as
profitably in ideas as in events. Scott claims, in his own words, that "the
values of art do not lie in the sequence but in the individual terms"
(Scott, 1954). It cannot be denied that for the growth of science as of
art the study of a succession of past changes can never substitute for the
creative impulse that itself creates change. But neither can it be denied,
for science or for art, that the new creativity is always somehow related
to the old. Insofar as the whole essence of science is that it builds
upon what has been built before, the new and the old become inseparable.
What Scott has failed to remember, in his treatment of the biological
fallacy, is that biology has exploded a fallacy of its own, namely, the one
which used to be embodied in the now no longer tenable biogenetic
law. What Scott has perhaps been thinking about is the phylogeny of
ideas, not their ontogeny. In embryology, we now consider ontogeny to
be responsible for phylogeny, rather than the reverse. If we can continue
to see value in studying the ontogeny, not the phylogeny, of ideas, by
concentrating on this we not only avoid the pitfall of Scott's biological
fallacy, but we furthermore place ourselves in a position in which we can
judge our own creative contributions from at least an improved, if not yet
an ideal, point of perspective. It has just been said above, that the study
of a succession of past changes can never substitute for the creative
impulse; it can, however, in the best event, guide it. As the foremost
experimentalist of us all has predicted, "Die Universalmethode des
causalen Anatomen wird ebensowenig die Anwendung des Messers wie
des Farbstoffes oder des Maasses, sondern die Geistesanatomie, das
analytische, caúsale Denken sein" (Roux, 1885a, pp. 22-23).
REFERENCES
Andrews, G. F. 1897a. Some spinning activities of protoplasm in starfish and
Echinus eggs. /. Morphol. 12: 367-389.
Andrews, G. F. 1897b. The living substance as such: and as organism. /.
Morphol 12, Suppl. No. 2: 1-176.
Baker, J. R. 1948. The cell-theory: a restatement, history, and critique. Part I.
Quart. J. Microscop. Set. 89: 103-125.