TWENTIETH CENTURY EMBRYOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
35
in very curious contrast to another group of investigators who are as perpetually plagued as are the embryologists by the relationships of sequences of events in time to properties of integration; namely, the neurologists concerned with higher brain function, who much more often
than the embryologists fall back on the musical analogy. Investigators of
the caliber of Wilder Penfield, Russell Brain, and Stanley Cobb, for
instance have all recently done so.
The kind of metaphor by which one illustrates one's mental processes
is hardly fraught with significance for the progress of science. What is
essential is that in every manner possible present energies be concentrated on the efforts of trying in a new way to break into the problem
of coping with differentiation as change in time (a problem which has
never been more lucidly posed for embryology than by Harrison in
1937). We have been speaking of differences between the 19th and
20th centuries. Toying with the romantic musical analogy is a 19th century, not a 20th century, conception. What may be its 20th century
equivalent? The embryologists, beyond Harrison, have not framed it.
Have the neurologists succeeded where the embryologists have not?
It is just possible that they may have bared the clue, in that they have
at least publicly recognized (see the completely brilliant article by
Fessard, 1954, on the relations of nervous integration to conscious experience) that microphysicists, confronted by similar difficulties of explaining an internal multiplicity of objects and the fundamental unity of
their behavior, have found useful the invention of the concept of stationary states, during which the passage of time is said to have no
meaning, and have at least raised the question as to the significance of
this concept for the study of consciousness. Has such a concept nothing
to say to embryology? The embryology of the 20th century has been
rapid to borrow technological method from 20th century physical science.
It might well, during the remaining half of the century, dip more consistently into some of its deeper resources.
These remarks have not been framed with the intent to express dismay
at the extent of what has so far been accomplished in embryology—in
fact, quite the opposite. Many embryologists seem all too prone at the
moment to apologize for the present state of what they consider the
decadence of embryology. The record suggests that they are quite unfair in doing so.
The principle of progressive differentiation, of which we keep speaking, is as old as Aristotle, it is true. But it is almost wholly within the
present century that its significance has been made clear by analytical
35
in very curious contrast to another group of investigators who are as perpetually plagued as are the embryologists by the relationships of sequences of events in time to properties of integration; namely, the neurologists concerned with higher brain function, who much more often
than the embryologists fall back on the musical analogy. Investigators of
the caliber of Wilder Penfield, Russell Brain, and Stanley Cobb, for
instance have all recently done so.
The kind of metaphor by which one illustrates one's mental processes
is hardly fraught with significance for the progress of science. What is
essential is that in every manner possible present energies be concentrated on the efforts of trying in a new way to break into the problem
of coping with differentiation as change in time (a problem which has
never been more lucidly posed for embryology than by Harrison in
1937). We have been speaking of differences between the 19th and
20th centuries. Toying with the romantic musical analogy is a 19th century, not a 20th century, conception. What may be its 20th century
equivalent? The embryologists, beyond Harrison, have not framed it.
Have the neurologists succeeded where the embryologists have not?
It is just possible that they may have bared the clue, in that they have
at least publicly recognized (see the completely brilliant article by
Fessard, 1954, on the relations of nervous integration to conscious experience) that microphysicists, confronted by similar difficulties of explaining an internal multiplicity of objects and the fundamental unity of
their behavior, have found useful the invention of the concept of stationary states, during which the passage of time is said to have no
meaning, and have at least raised the question as to the significance of
this concept for the study of consciousness. Has such a concept nothing
to say to embryology? The embryology of the 20th century has been
rapid to borrow technological method from 20th century physical science.
It might well, during the remaining half of the century, dip more consistently into some of its deeper resources.
These remarks have not been framed with the intent to express dismay
at the extent of what has so far been accomplished in embryology—in
fact, quite the opposite. Many embryologists seem all too prone at the
moment to apologize for the present state of what they consider the
decadence of embryology. The record suggests that they are quite unfair in doing so.
The principle of progressive differentiation, of which we keep speaking, is as old as Aristotle, it is true. But it is almost wholly within the
present century that its significance has been made clear by analytical