conflict, but conflict is unlikely to occur, paradoxically, until the inequality is
reduced. This is because it is irrational for a weaker population to revolt or
invade with no chance of victory. In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide was not
instigated by the most deprived section of its population.
Even if the ‘sustainability transition’ accelerates sufficiently to enable a
‘factor four’ world — doubling resource output yet halving the ecological cost
— it is still likely that the per capita availability of water, arable land and other
critical environmental resources will decline. Spectacular technological improvements in the exploration and recovery of oil have not abolished concerns that
the end of cheap oil is likely in this century: future oil wars are therefore also
possible.
On a more speculative level, there is the possibility that climate change may
interact with natural resource stresses — such as water scarcity — and expanding
human populations, to increase the possibility of conflict. Many parts of Africa
already experience a less than favourable agricultural climate, and under various
climate models this already less-than-favourable climate is forecast to deteriorate
in the second half of this century. In that case, the likelihood of conflict would
increase.
Global warming has also been identified as possibly intensifying the El Nin o
Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Stronger, more frequent El Nin os and La Nin as
would be likely to lead to increased adverse social, economic, and health
consequences in different regions over a widespread area. These, in turn,
would tend to increase the risk of conflict in resource-scarce areas, for example by
increasing regional food scarcity through intensified droughts.
Ecosystem changes, especially from deforestation, the infilling of wetlands and
the replacement of coastal mangroves by aquaculture, may also have adverse
effects on resource security, including through an interaction with rising seas and
more intense storms. The flooding of the Yangtze river basin in 1998, in China,
has been attributed to a complex web of factors, including heavy rain associated
with an El Nin o event, deforestation which increased water runoff, and more
intensive cultivation of lakes and wetlands in the river basin which reduced their
‘sponge’ function. Changes have been called for in Chinese ecosystem management
to try to avert such events in the future.
Falling biodiversity may not obviously appear to aggravate the risk of conflict.
The loss of genetic information will reduce the isolation of useful chemicals and
the discovery of potentially useful biological principles, but is unlikely to lead to
A. Hurrell, in Security and Inequality, ed. A. Hurrell and N. Woods, Oxford University Press, 1999.
A. J. McMichael, K. R. Smith and C. F. Corvalan, Bull. World Health Org., 2000, 78, 1067.
P. Hawken, A. B. Lovins and L. H. Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial
Revolution, Little Brown & Company, 1999.
E. von Weizsa¨ cker, A. B. Lovins and L. H. Lovins, Factor 4. Doubling Wealth — Halving Resource
Use. A New Report to the Club of Rome, Earthscan, London, 1997.
J. Rauch, Atlantic Monthly, 2001, 287, 35.
C. B. Hatfield, Nature, 1997, 388, 618.
H. S. Houthakker, Nature, 1997, 388, 618.
A. Timmermann, J. Oberhuber, A. Bacher, M. Esch, M. Latif and E. Roeckner, Nature, 1999, 398, 694.
M. J. Bouma, R. S. Kovats, S. A. Goubet, J. Cox and A. Haines, Lancet, 1997, 350, 1435.
J. N. Abramovitz, in Averting Unnatural Disasters, ed. L. Starke, New York, 2001.
Global Environmental Changes and Human Health
155
reduced. This is because it is irrational for a weaker population to revolt or
invade with no chance of victory. In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide was not
instigated by the most deprived section of its population.
Even if the ‘sustainability transition’ accelerates sufficiently to enable a
‘factor four’ world — doubling resource output yet halving the ecological cost
— it is still likely that the per capita availability of water, arable land and other
critical environmental resources will decline. Spectacular technological improvements in the exploration and recovery of oil have not abolished concerns that
the end of cheap oil is likely in this century: future oil wars are therefore also
possible.
On a more speculative level, there is the possibility that climate change may
interact with natural resource stresses — such as water scarcity — and expanding
human populations, to increase the possibility of conflict. Many parts of Africa
already experience a less than favourable agricultural climate, and under various
climate models this already less-than-favourable climate is forecast to deteriorate
in the second half of this century. In that case, the likelihood of conflict would
increase.
Global warming has also been identified as possibly intensifying the El Nin o
Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Stronger, more frequent El Nin os and La Nin as
would be likely to lead to increased adverse social, economic, and health
consequences in different regions over a widespread area. These, in turn,
would tend to increase the risk of conflict in resource-scarce areas, for example by
increasing regional food scarcity through intensified droughts.
Ecosystem changes, especially from deforestation, the infilling of wetlands and
the replacement of coastal mangroves by aquaculture, may also have adverse
effects on resource security, including through an interaction with rising seas and
more intense storms. The flooding of the Yangtze river basin in 1998, in China,
has been attributed to a complex web of factors, including heavy rain associated
with an El Nin o event, deforestation which increased water runoff, and more
intensive cultivation of lakes and wetlands in the river basin which reduced their
‘sponge’ function. Changes have been called for in Chinese ecosystem management
to try to avert such events in the future.
Falling biodiversity may not obviously appear to aggravate the risk of conflict.
The loss of genetic information will reduce the isolation of useful chemicals and
the discovery of potentially useful biological principles, but is unlikely to lead to
A. Hurrell, in Security and Inequality, ed. A. Hurrell and N. Woods, Oxford University Press, 1999.
A. J. McMichael, K. R. Smith and C. F. Corvalan, Bull. World Health Org., 2000, 78, 1067.
P. Hawken, A. B. Lovins and L. H. Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial
Revolution, Little Brown & Company, 1999.
E. von Weizsa¨ cker, A. B. Lovins and L. H. Lovins, Factor 4. Doubling Wealth — Halving Resource
Use. A New Report to the Club of Rome, Earthscan, London, 1997.
J. Rauch, Atlantic Monthly, 2001, 287, 35.
C. B. Hatfield, Nature, 1997, 388, 618.
H. S. Houthakker, Nature, 1997, 388, 618.
A. Timmermann, J. Oberhuber, A. Bacher, M. Esch, M. Latif and E. Roeckner, Nature, 1999, 398, 694.
M. J. Bouma, R. S. Kovats, S. A. Goubet, J. Cox and A. Haines, Lancet, 1997, 350, 1435.
J. N. Abramovitz, in Averting Unnatural Disasters, ed. L. Starke, New York, 2001.
Global Environmental Changes and Human Health
155